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No. 78-5374
SMITH (robber)

v.

SUMMARY:

bc<ck .per Cnvtwuu.f--

r--ed~ .
~q .

Cert to Md. ct. ZA~p~p'.--------------~------
(Murphy, Smith, Levine, Orth;
Digges, Eldridge, Cole, dissenting)
State/Criminal

MARYLAND
1.

Oh-

,0~

Timely

Does the installation of a pen register constitute a

search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?
2.

FACTS:

Ms. McDonough was robbed.

She gave police a descriptior.

of the robber and of a 1975 Monte carlo that she had observed in her
neighborhood shortly before the robbery.
receiving threatening and obscene

phon~

After the robbery, she began
calls from a man who identified
......

- 2 himself as the person who robbed her.

Police spotted a man who met the

description of the robber driving a 1975 Monte Carlo.

By tracing the

license number of the vehicle, police learned that the car was registered
in petr's name.

At

the ~equest

of the police, the telephone company

installed a pen register at its central offices to record the phone
did not
numbers of all calls from the telephone at petr's residence. Police I
obtain

a warrant or court order before installing the pen register.

Thereafter, the pen register showed that a call was made to McDonough's
home.

Armed with a search warrant, police searched petr's home and

found a notation of McDonough's telephone number next to petr's phone.
McDonough identified petr as the robber at a line-up.

At a pretrial

suppression hearing, petr argued that evidence resulting from the
installation of the pen register should be suppressed because absent a
court order or search warrant, the use of a pen register constituted an
illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The

trial judge denied the motion, petr was found guilty of robbery and
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.

The Maryland court of Appeals af-

firmed.
3.

DECISION BELOW:

The majority stated that under Katz v. United

States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the question whether installation of a
pen register requires compliance with the Fourth Amendment depends on
"whether a telephone subscriber has a constitutionally protected expectation that the numbers which he dials will remain private."

The court

held that a subscriber does not have a constitutionally protected ex-

- 3 pectation of privacy with respect to the numbers dialed

----..--... v

for two reasons.

every subscriber realizes that the phone company keeps records

of toll calls and there seems no valid distinction between the expectations associated with local calls and toll calls because most subscribers probably have no "real knowledge" of +-he geographic boundaries
on their "local call" zone.

all telephone subscribers use

equipment owned by a third party and therefore it is unreasonable to
assume that the fact of one's call passing through the system will remain
a total secret from the phone company.

While the Fourth Amendment

.
v-.
protects t h e content of conversat1ons, pen reg1sters do not reveal that

content and they are regularly used by the phone company without a court
order "for the purposes of checking billing operations, detecting fraud
and preventing violations of the law."
434 U.S. 159, 174-75 (1977).

United States v. New York Tel.,

The court found support for its

conclusion~

in cases dealing with the attachment of transmitters to informants,
inspection of bank deposit slips turned over to the , bank, use of beepers,
and reading of mail covers, all of which either this Court or other
courts have held do not violate the Fourth Amendment.

The majority

cited several cases in which courts have held that telephone subscribers
have no reasonable expectation that records of their calls will not be
made.

See,

~·

Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 555 F.2d 254

(9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1975).
believe
The dissenters /
that the installation of a pen register constitutE
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

While a subscriber

- 4 may expect that completed long distance

~alls

will be recorded, the

subscriber does not expect that the phone company will monitor the
telephone numbers of local calls.

Contrary to the majority's view,

subscribers are aware of their "local ·call" zone because, at least in
Maryland, they must dial the prefix "1" before they can make a call
beyond that zone.

"The defendant, by the simple act of dialing local

numbers·, did not reasonably intend to reveal information7 he merely
made use of machinery in particular ways which, without the police intrusion, would have remained fully private."

They found the analogy to

the transmitter-on-informer and bank deposit slip

cases unpersuasive

because the phone company is not a "party" to telephone conversations in

parties to the conversations or
the same sense as the informer and bank are/

ba~k

transactions.

Mail cover cases also are

distinguishable since anything written on the outside of an
is placed in the plain view of the public.

envelope

Finally, the dissenters noted

that several courts have held that the installation of pen registers is
subject to Fourth Amendment requirements.

See,

~,

Southwestern Bell

Tel. v. United States, 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,

u.s.

(1918); New York Tel. v. United States, 538 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.

1976), cert. denied, 434

u.s.

149 (1977)7 United States v. Illinois Bell

Tel., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976)7 United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975).
4.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr simply repeats the arguments of the dissenter £

He claims that there is a split among the lower courts on this question
------

j

as evidenced by the cases relied on by the majority and dissenters and

- 5 that the court should grant cert in

thi~

case to resolve the conflict.

Finally, he argues that the following statement by Mr. Justice Powell,
concurring and dissenting, in United States v. Giordano, 416
553-54 (1974)

505,

"should be dispositive of this issue":

"Because a pen register is not subject to the
provisions of Title III, the permissibility of
its use by law enforcement authorities depends
entirely on compliance with the constitutional
requirements of the Fourth Amendment."
5.

u.s.

DISCUSSION:

L r:=P

This court has not yet determined whether pen

register surveillance is subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amend -

V

ment.

The question was specifically reserved in United States v. New

Tel., 434

u.s.

159, 165 n. 7 (1977).

Yo ~

And in a footnote following the

above-quoted statement by Mr. Justice Powell in Giordano, he stated that
'

'

he did not have to address the question whether the use of a pen registe l
constitutes a search because, assuming the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment, its requirements were satisfied in that case.

416

u.s.

at

The claimed split in the circuits on this question may be

554 n. 4.

c

more apparent than real.

The court in John specifically declined to

~,----------------~------~~ -~

decide whether the use of pen registers constitutes a search.
the
is a
~-

o~r

case~ __re~~ly

search~
-

-

~owell __~.!:!_ied

addressed_ the

qu~stion

instead, they simply quoted

--

---

None of

-------

whether use of the device

the_pt~e~ent f~Mr.

Justice

on by petr and __9SS~-~e__:l that the Fourth Amendment governs

installation of pen registers, apparently without recognizing that Mr.
c::.....6

Justice Powell declined to decide that question.

In any event, in all

of the cases relied on by the dissenters, the Government had secured a

- 6 court order or warrant before installing the pen register.

Hodge, supra,

relied on by the majority, was a § 1983 action against the telephone
company in which the CA 9 held that, assuming state action, the expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment attaches to the content

a
of/telephone conversation and not to the fact that the conversation took
place.

In Clegg, supra, the CA 5 stated in dicta that the

overnment's

use of a pen register would not be subject to the Fourth Amendment's
requirements.

conflict

Thus, there is no clear /

in the "holdings" of the cases

seem
cited, although the predilections of the courts cited/

obvious and

those predispositions do differ.
Should the court be interested in addressing this issue, despite
the lack of a clear conflict below, this case may be a good candidate.
The opinions below are well researched and thoughtful, and the factual
setting of this case is uncomplicated and squarely serves up the issue.
There is no response, but I understand that one already has been
requested.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 78-5374

I

Michael Lee Smith, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to
v.
the Court of Appeals of
State of Maryland.
Maryland.
[June -, 1979]
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the installatiou
and use of a pen register 1 constitutes a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment," made applicable to the
States through the Fourteeuth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U. S. 643 (1961).
I
On March 5, 1976, in Baltimore, Md., Patricia McDonough
was robbed. She gave the police a description of the robber
and of a 1975 Monte Carlo automobile she had observed near
the scene of the crime. Tr. 66- 68. After the robbery,
1 "A pen register is a mechanical device that rerords the numbers dialed
on a telephone by monitoring the electrira1 impulses cauf:ed whrn the dial
on the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communication s
and does not indicate whet her calls are actually complrted." United
States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n . 1 (1977). A pen rrgi ~ trr iH " usually in;,;ta11Pd at a crntntl telephone facility [and] record;,; on
a paper tape all numbers dialed from rnle] line" to which it i:l attached.
United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505, 549 n . 1 (1974) (opinion concurring in part and di<'Scnting in part) . Sre ~1l so United States v. New
York Tel. Co., 434 U. S., a.t 162.
2 "The right of the people to be ~Pc ure in their persons, house:-<, papPrs,
and pffectH, ngain::<t unreasonable 8earches and ~Pizures, :;hall not be viOlatf'd, and no Warrant ~ shall i~~ ue, hut upon probable cam;e, ~upporte d by
Oath or affirmation, and particular!~ · describing the place to be ~ parched,
and the persons or things to be seized." U. S. Canst., Amdt. 4

----
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McDonough began receiving threatening and obscene phone
calls from a man identifying himself as the robber. On one
occasion , the caller asked that she step out on her front porch;
she did so, and saw the 1975 Monte Carlo she had earlier described to police moving slowly past her home. I d., at 70.
On March 16, police spotted a man who met McDonough's
description driving a 1975 Monte Carlo in her neighborhood.
!d. , at 71-72. By tracing the license plate number, police
learned that the car was registered in the name of petitioner,
Michael Lee Smith. !d., at 72.
The next day, the telephone company, at police request, installed a pen register at its central offices to record the numbers dialed from the telephone at petitioner's home. I d., at
73, 75. Police did not get a warrant or court order before
having the pen register installed. The register revealed that
on March 17 a call was placed from petitioner's home to
McDonough's phone. !d. , at 74. On the basis of this and
other evidence, police obtained a warrant to search petitioner's
residence. I d., at 75. The search revealed that a page in
petitioner's phone book was turned down to the name and
number of Patricia McDonough; the phone book was seized.
Ibid. Petitioner was arrested , and a six-man line-up was held
on March 19. McDonough identified petitioner as the man
who had robbed her. !d., at 70-71.
Petitioner was indicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore
for robbery. By pretrial motion, he sought to suppress "all
fruits derived from the pen register" on the ground that police
had failed to secure a warrant prior to its installation. Record 14; Tr. 54- 56. The trial court denied the suppression
motion , holding that the warrantless installation of the pen
register did not violate the Fourth Amendment. I d., at 63.
Petitioner then waived a jury, and the case was submitted to
the court on an agreed statement of facts. !d. , at 65- 66.
The pen register tape (evidencing the fact that a phone call
had been made from petitiouer's phone to McDonough's.

'

J
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phone) and the phone book seized in the search of petitioner's
residence were admitted into evidence against him. I d., at
74-76.
Petitioner was convicted, id., at 78, and was sentenced to six years. He appealed to the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals, but the Court of Appeals of Maryland issued
a writ of certiorari to the intermediate court in advance of its
decision in order to consider whether the pen register evidence
had been properly admitted at petitioner's trial. 283 Md.
156, 160, 389 A. 2d 858, 860 (1978).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction,
holding that "there is no constitutionally protected reasonable
expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed into a telephone
system and hence no search within the Fourth Amendment is
implicated by the use of a pen register installed at the central
offices of the telephone company." ld., at 173, 389 A. 2d, at
867. Because there was no "search," the court concluded, no
warrant was needed. Three judges dissented, expressing the
view that individuals do have a legitimate expectation of
privacy regarding the phone numbers they dial from their
homes; that the installation of a pen register thus constitutes
a "search"; and that, in the absence of exigent circumstances,
the failure of police to secure a warrant mandated that the
pen register evidence here be excluded. !d., at 174, 178, 389
A. 2d, at 868, 870. Certiorari was granted in order to resolve
indications of conflict in the decided cases as to the restrictions imposed by the Fourth Amendment on the use of pen
U. S. (1978).
registers. 3 3 See Application of the United States for an Order, Etc., 546 F . 2d 243 ,
245 (CAS 1976), cert. denied, 434 U . S. 1008 (1978) ; Application of U. S.
in Matter of Order, Etc ., 5:~8 F . 2d 956, 959-960 (CA2 1976), rev 'd on
other grounds s'Ub nom. United States v. N ew York Tel. Co .. 434 U. S.
159 (1977) ; United States v. Falcone, 505 F . 2d 478, 482, and n. 21 (CA3
1974), cert . denied, 420 U. S. 955 (1975), Hodge v. MO'Untain States Tel.
& Tel. Co ., 555 F. 2d 254,256 (CMl 1977). id., at 266 (concurring; opinion) ,
and United States v. ('legg, 500 F . 2d 605, 610 (CA5 1975) . In previous
decision:;, this Court has not found it ner e~sa.ry to consider whether '·pen

78-5374-0PINION
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II
A
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "{t"lhe right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." In determining whether a particular form of government-initiated
electronic surveillance is a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment,' our lodestar is Katz v. United States,
389 U. S. 347 (1967). In Katz, Government agents had intercepted the contents of a telephone conversation by attach~
ing an electronic listening device to the outside of a public
phone booth. The Court rejected the argument that a
"search" can occur only when there has been a "physical intrusion" into a "constitutionally protected area," noting that
the Fourth Amendment "protects people. not places." I d.,
at 351-353. Because the Government's monitoring of Katz'
conversation "violated the privacy upon which he justifiably
relied while using the telephone booth," the Court held that
it "constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment." !d., at 353.
Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that
the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether
the person invoking its protection can claim a "justifiable," a
"reasonable." or a "legitimate expectation of privacy" that
has been invaded by government action. E. g., Rakas v..
register survrillance [is] subject. to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment." United States v. New York Tel. Co .. 434 U.S., at 165 n. 7. See
United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S., at 554 n. 4 (opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
4 In this case, the pen rrgio;ter was installed, and the numbt>rs dialrd
wrre rrcorded, by thr telephonr rompany. Tr. 73-74. The telephone
company, however, acted at police reque~t. !d., at 73, 75. In view of
thi;;, rrspondrnt. appears to concedr that. the comr1any is to bP deemed an
"agent" of the police for purposE's of this rasP, so as to render the installation and u~e of the pen register "state action" under the Fomth and Fourteenth Amendmrnts. Wr may lM:>umr that "state action" wao; pre>:Pnt herP,

78-537 4-0PINION•
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Illinois,- U. S. - , - , and n. 12 (1978); id., a t - , (concurring opinion); id., at - , (dissenting opinion);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 7 (1977); United
States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 442 (1976); United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 14 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409
U. S. 322, 335-336 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U. S.
745, 752 (1971); (plurality opinion); Mancusi v. DeForte,
392 U. S. 364, 368 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 9
( 1968). This inquiry, as Mr. Justice Harlan aptly noted in
his Katz concurrence, embraces two discrete questions. The
first is whether the individual, by this conduct, has "exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy," 389 U. S., at
361-whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual has shown that "he seeks to preserve [something] as private." Id., at 351. The secoud question is whether the
individual's subjective expectation of privacy is "one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable,' " id., at 361whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual's
expectation, viewed objectively, is "justifiabl[e]" under the
circumstances. !d., at 353. See Rakas v. Illinois,- U. S.,
a t - n. 12, id., a t - (concurring opinion); United States v.
White, 401 U. S., at 752 (plurality opinion).

B
In applying the Katz analysis to this case, it is important
to begin by specifying precisely the nature of the state activity that is challenged. The activity here took the form of
installing and using a pen register. Since the pen register
was installed on telephone company property at the telephone
company's central offices, petitioner obviously cannot claim
that his "property"' was invaded or that police intruded into
e. "constitutionally protected area." Petitioner's claim,
rather, is that, notwithstanding the absence of a trespass, the
State, as did the Government in Katz, infringed a "legitimate
expectation of privacy" petitioner held. Yet a pen register
differs significantly from the listening device employed in

78-537 4-0PINION
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Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of communications. This Court recently noted:
"Indeed, a law enforcement official could not even determine from the use of a pen register whether a communication existed. These devices do not hear sound. They
disclose only the telephone numbers that have been
dialed-a means of establishing communication. Neither
the purport of any communication between the caller and
the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the
call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers."
United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U. S., at 167.

Given a pen register's limited capabilities, therefore, petitioner's argument that its installation and use constituted a
"search" necessarily rests upon a claim that he had a "legitimate expectation of privacy" regarding the numbers he dialed
on his phone.
This claim. must be rejected. First, we doubt that people
in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the
numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must
"convey" phone numbers to the telephone company, since it
is through telephone company switching equipment that their
calls are completed. All subscribers reaiize, moreover, that
the phone cq>mpany has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they see a list of their longdistance (toll) calls on their monthly bills. In fact. pen
registers and similar devices are routinely used by telephone
companies "for the purposes of checking billing operations,
detecting fraud, and preventing violations of law." United
States v. 1Yew York Tel. Co., 434 U. S., at 174-175. Electronic equipment is used, uot only to keep billing records of
toll calls, but "to keep a record of all calls dialed from a telephone which is subject to a special rate structure." Hodge v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F. 2d 254, 266 (CA9
1977) (concurring opinion). Pen registers are regularly employed "to determine whether a home phone is being used to

78-5374-0PINlON
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conduct a business, to check for a defective dial, or to check
for overbilling." Note, The Legal Constraints upon the Use
of the Pen Register as a Law Enforcement Tool, 60 Cornell
L. Rev. 1028, 1029 (1975) (footnotes omitted). Although
most people may be oblivious to a pen register's esoteric functions, they presumably have some awareness of one common
use: to aid in the identification of persons making annoying
or obscene calls. See, e. g., Von Lusch v. C & P Tel. Co., 457
F. Supp. 815, 816 (Md. 1978); Note, 60 Cornell L. Rev., at
1029-1030, n. 11; Claerhout, The Pen Register, 20 Drake L.
Rev. 108, 110-111 (1979). Most phone books tell subscribers,
on a page entitled "Consumer Information," that the company "can frequently help in identifying to the authorities
the origin of unwelcome and troublesome calls." E. g., Baltimore Telephone Directory 21 (1978); District of Columbia
Telephone Directory 13 ( 1978). Telephone users, in sum,
typically know that they must convey numerical information
to the phone company; that the phone company has fa,cilities
for recording this information; and that the phone company
does in fact record this information for a variety of legitimate
business purposes. Although subjective expectations cannot
be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.
Petitioner argues, however, that, whatever the expectations
of telephone users in general, he demonstrated an expectation
of privacy by his own conduct here, since he "us[ed] the telephone in his house to the exclusion of all others." Brief for
Petitioner 6 (emphasis added). But the site of the call is
immaterial for purposes of analysis in this case. Although
petitioner's conduct may have been calculated to keep the
contents of his conversation private, his conduct was not and
could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the
number he dialed. Regardless of his location, petitioner had
to convey that number to the telephone company in precisely

78-537 4-0PINION
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the same way if he wished to complete his call. The fact
that he dialE>d the number on his home phone rather than on
some other phone could make no conceivable difference, nor
could any subscriber rationally think that it would.
Second, even if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain
private, this expectation is not "one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable.'" This Cohrt consistently has
held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties. E. g.,
United States v. Miller, 425 U. S., at 442-444; Couch v.
United States, 409 U. S., at 335-336; United States v. White,
401 U. S., at 752 (plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United States,
385 U. S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S.
427 (1963). In Miller, for example, the Court held that a
bank depositor has no "legitimate 'expectation of privacy' "
in financial information "voluntarily conveyed to ... banks
and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business." 425 U. S., at 442. The Court explained:
"The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs
to another, that the information will be conveyed by that
person to the Government. . . . This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
the obtaining of information revealed to a third party
and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even
if the information is revealed on the assumption that it
will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed." I d., at
443.
Because the depositor "assumed the risk" of disclosure, the
Court held that it would be unreasonable for him to expect
his financial records to n~main private.
This analysis dictates that petitioner can claim no legitimate
expectation of privacy here. When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the

L
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telephone company and "exposed" that information to its
equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing,
petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to
police the numbers he dialed. The switching equipment that
processed those numbers is merely the modern counterpart of
the operator who, in an earlier day, personally completed calls
for the subscriber. Petitioner concedes that if he had placed
his calls through an operator, he could claim no legitimate
expectation of privacy. Tr. of Oral Arg. 3--5, 11-12, 32. We
are not inclined to hold that a different constitutional result
is required because the telephone company has decided to
automate.
Petitioner argues, however. that automatic switching equip~
ment differs from a live operator in one pertinent respect.
An operator, in theory at least, is capable of remembering
every number that is conveyed to him by callers. Electronic
equipment, by contrast, can "remember" only those numbers
it is programmed to record, and telephone companies, in view
of their present billing practices, usually do not record local
calls. Since petitioner, in calling McDonough, was making a
local call, his expectation of privacy as to her number, on this
theory, would be "legitimate."
This argument does not withstand scrutiny. The fortuity
of whether or not the phone company in fact elects to make a
quasi-permanent record of a particular number dialed does
not, in our view, make any constitutional differences. Regardless of the phone company's election, petitioner voluntarily conveyed to it information that it had facilities for
recording and that it was free to record. In these circumstances, petitioner assumed the risk that the information
would be divulged to police. Under petitioner's theory,
Fourth Amendment protection would exist, or not, depending
on how the telephone company chose to define local-dialing
zones, and depending on how it chose to bill its customers for
local calls. Calls placed across town, or dialed directly, would
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be protected; calls placed across the river, or dialed with op~
erator assistance, might not be. We are not inclined to make
a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment, especially in circumstances where (as here) the pattern of protection would be
dictated by billing practices of a private corporation.
We therefore conclude that petitioner in all probability
entertained no actual expectation of privacy in the phone
numbers he dialed, and that. even if he did, his expectation
was not "legitimate." The installation and use of a pen register. consequently, was not a "search," and no warrant was
required. The judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals
is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
MR. JusTICE PowELL took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
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